Abstract. This paper discusses some of the problems associated with the efficient economic design of markets for catastrophe insurance and the regulation of private companies offering such insurance. The paper first considers the elements of the problem, on both the demand and supply side. On the demand side, we point to well-known difficulties of consumers and small businesses to evaluate the benefits of insurance relative to other approaches to risk bearing and risk mitigation. On the supply side, we note the inherent problems of insuring losses from natural hazards because of the correlated structure of the underlying loss distributions. Finally, regulatory problems associated with solvency, price and entry regulation for catastrophe insurance are analyzed. The paper concludes that the volatile mix of demand-side failures, supply-side complexities and regulatory manipulation are likely to make this area an important and difficult one for efficient economic design.
Introduction
Natural hazards, including floods, hurricanes and earthquakes, can cause significant economic losses through structural damage and disruption of normal economic activities, not to mention the huge human losses associated with these events in emerging economies. This paper discusses the problems associated with the use of private insurance to provide risk-bearing capability against the losses from these hazards. These stem from problems on both the demand side and the supply side, which can be caused or exacerbated by regulatory policies. On the demand side, there are a variety of behavioral anomalies that undermine such insurance markets. Even without these, the correlated loss distributions characteristic of natural hazards give rise to difficulties that complicate the usual pooling efficiencies of private insurance. 1 Correlations among losses arise because concen-trations of insurer portfolios of business in a given region, all of which may face the same hazard. The interaction of these supply and demand problems has given rise to a third set of difficulties associated with regulators trying to "fix" the former two problems. The resulting mix of confused consumers, constrained insurers and often misplaced regulation provides a rich plate of opportunities for economic design to provide some guidance for structuring the necessary institutions for viable catastrophe insurance. We examine a few of these here. The structure of catastrophe insurance markets is complex. As described in Kleindorfer and Kunreuther (1999a) , a number of scientific and engineering disciplines provide input to risk quantification and risk modeling to estimate losses and to provide necessary inputs for risk-based pricing. The now accepted process for doing this estimation is to use large-scale simulation models for the hazard in question. For example, for seismic hazards in the Istanbul region, a list of several thousand representative seismic events would be determined (differentiated by location and magnitude) and, for each of these events, the losses resulting from the event for a set of structures would be individually evaluated by simulating the likely damages for each structure and each event. Thereafter these event-specific loss distributions would be further weighted by the estimated recurrence times for each of the events, to obtain finally the (estimated) loss distribution for the given set of structures during a specified time period, e.g., a year. If this set of structures were precisely identified as those insured by a particular insurer, then this loss distribution would provide estimates of the probability distribution of losses the insurer would face to its book of business in the Istanbul region. By truncating individual distributions to account for deductibles and policy limits, realistic insurance policy provisions can be evaluated. The key issue of interest to most insurers is, of course, the management of their overall exposures. If these are too concentrated in a vulnerable area, then one event can wipe out the insurer.
The above narrative applies equally well to developed and emerging economies, but some of the details are more challenging in emerging economies. For example, for flood, hurricane or earthquake exposures, the precise location of an insured structure is extremely important for an accurate simulation of any of the events in the hazard event table driving these simulations. Very often, however, accurate building inventories, including specific information on the type of each insured structure, are not available. Also, knowledge of the vulnerabilities of specific structures may be lacking (e.g., because of lack of standardization of building design). These difficulties will be overcome with time, as private insurance begins to establish itself in an economy and catastrophe modeling and actuarial methods from international practice are implemented. Indeed, a fundamental reason for developing private insurance markets in the first place is that the residual claimant/owner of the insurance company has strong incentives to obtain such information and to use it to price any catastrophe coverage offered. Thus, our focus here mated through models that rely on the best scientific information and many assumptions that can only be validated ex post.
will be less on the underlying science of catastrophe modeling, which we will assume is in place, and more on those characteristics of insurance markets for catastrophe risks that seem less amenable to obvious solutions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with a brief examination of the problems confronting consumers of catastrophe insurance, highlighting a variety of behavioral anomalies in consumer purchase decisions of both insurance protection and the substitute good of other ex ante protective activities such as structural mitigation measures. We then consider a model of insurer decisions for a privately owned, profit-maximizing insurer. The model emphasizes the determination of an appropriate capital structure for the insurance firm to cover a specific set of geographically diversified coverages. To guard against the entry of poorly capitalized insurers, and perhaps for other demand-side reasons, insurance regulations are usually established to regulate entry, price and solvency of insurers. We briefly consider the effects of such regulation on a typical insurer. The paper concludes with some reflections on the challenges for economic design inherent in private catastrophe insurance markets, including the special problems of emerging economies that may be attempting for the first time to establish such markets.
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Catastrophe Insurance: The Demand Side
The demand for insurance enjoys a long literature in general (e.g., Arrow, 1971; Dionne and Harrington, 1992) and for catastrophe loss in particular (e.g., Kunreuther, 1998) . In the simplest case, a potential insurance buyer can undertake ex ante protective care (think of this as structural mitigation measures to reinforce the soundness of the buyer's building so as to reduce the losses from natural hazards).
The cost of such mitigation measures is denoted by z. The buyer can also purchase insurance coverage. Thereafter, the buyer faces a loss L(z) that can occur in a particular period (say a year) with a probability r(z) ∈ (0, 1), and a loss of 0 with probability 1 -r(z). We assume that insurance is offered at a cost of "c" per unit (e.g., per $) of coverage M purchased (where we assume losses are only covered up to the level of the loss). Assuming the buyer has preferences that can be represented by expected utility, the buyer will undertake protective activity z ≥ 0 and purchase coverage M ≥ 0 so as to maximize:
where W is the buyer's initial wealth. Since our focus here is on natural hazards, we assume r(z) = r, independent of z. Then, assuming that L(z) is monotonic decreasing and convex in protective activity x and that U(W) is concave and increasing in wealth W, maximization of (1) is easily seen to imply that no more than full coverage will be purchased, M ≤ L(z). Now assume that insurance premiums satisfy the viability condition c ≥ r for non-negative profits for the insurer. From this, it follows that if full coverage is taken (M = L(z)), then L'(z) = dL/dz = -1/c ≥ -1/r at optimum. In the absence of insurance (M = 0), the buyer with preferences as given in (1) would set z such that
where the inequality follows from the assumed concavity of U. The availability of insurance decreases the incentives for mitigation/ex ante protective activity (i.e., moral hazard exists here). More generally, comparative statics for the solution to (1) show that the optimal x satisfies z'(c) > 0 (so that the higher the price of insurance, the stronger the incentives for mitigation). Note, however, that the socially optimal level of protective care minimizes z + rL(z) (i.e., L'(z) = -1/r), so that when insurance is too expensive to purchase any coverage, (2) implies that the risk-averse expected utility maximizer will actually mitigate more than socially efficient. 2 A number of wrinkles can be added to (1)- (2), such as deductibles, nonlinear contracts, misperceptions by the buyer of probabilities or losses, etc. See Kunreuther (1996 Kunreuther ( , 1998 for some of these.
While the above theory has served economics well in motivating a great deal of research on insurance markets, it has become clear through empirical research that the model embodied in (1)- (2) is not satisfactory as a model of the actual behavior of insurance buyers, especially for catastrophe insurance. As Kunreuther (1996 Kunreuther ( , 1998 notes, potential insurance buyers tend to be myopic and uninformed (about probabilities, losses and types of coverage available) in their purchase of both insurance coverage and mitigation measures. The consequence of these interacting effects is typically that these consumers do nothing before the event and plead for government assistance after the event. This has given rise in many countries to compulsory insurance and building codes in hazard-prone areas in order to encourage some minimal level of insurance coverage and the adoption of reasonable structural standards when they would prefer not to do so in the absence of such regulations.
3 If coverage regulations are to be make sense economically, they cannot be arbitrary, of course. In particular, pricing for mandated coverages must reflect economically sensible, i.e., risk-based prices, and building codes must reflect cost-effective mitigation measures, requirements whose expected reductions in losses over time can cover the upfront costs of such measures. In addition to these issues on the demand side, the design of such regulations has to confront significant complexities on the supply side.
The Supply of Catastrophe Insurance
This section illustrate the tradeoffs for insurers in catastrophe insurance markets where there may be significant regulatory frictions preventing optimal adjustment of the insurers' portfolios. We frame the analysis in terms of a solvencyconstrained, expected profit maximizing insurer model for a specific insurer (the model dates from Stone, 1973) . The model captures several tradeoffs. The level of the solvency constraint itself reflects the insurer's appetite for risk and, in particular, the tradeoff between the costs of increased surplus and the franchise value of the firm going forward, which is put at risk under insolvency. For any specific target level of insolvency probability, maximizing expected returns from a given equity base implies that the insurer will attempt to market its risk coverage to a geographically diversified portfolio of risks. On the other hand, scale economies in marketing, distribution and claims processing may drive the company to market more intensively in some areas than in others, leading to increased (positive) correlation among the risks in the insurer's portfolio. The model thus is intended to embody the interaction of demand and marketing payoffs relative to the costs of the capital required to support the book of business chosen by the insurer. These tradeoffs will be further complicated if regulators contravene adequate rates or promote cross-subsidies through rate compression.
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The Solvency-Constrained Insurer's Problem
Fix attention on a particular insurer in a specified region, e.g., the State of Florida.
Denote by x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) the vector of exposures for the insurer, where x i is the insurer's exposure in insurance zone i in the region. In keeping with the notion that the insurance market is workably competitive, we assume that the firm is a price-taker in the market, with price in zone i per unit of exposure given by p i . Let L i (x i ) be the random variable representing losses in zone i and let L(x) = L 1 (x 1 ) + L 2 (x 2 ) + ... + L n (x n ) denote total losses. Losses in different zones may be correlated since the same "event" could create losses in more than one zone. Losses to different properties within a zone are correlated for the same reason. These losses may arise from catastrophe lines of business or from other lines. We return below to the interaction effects of multi-peril coverages. Denote by Π(x, A, K) the expected profits for the insurer for a typical year, where A are the assets of the insurer supporting the business x and K is additional risk-bearing capital described in more detail below. We write expected profits as: Marketing expenses M i will depend on company organizational variables such as its distribution system. We will think of K as reinsurance, but K could also be in the form of zero-coupon bonds. The important assumption we make about K is that the premium (or interest in the case of bonds) is prepaid, before losses are known, so that (1-r)K is actually available to pay losses if K units of reinsurance are purchased. The shareholder equity A that the insurer puts at risk may influence the rate r or the amount of reinsurance K obtainable. We take A and r as fixed here and assume that K is set to just satisfy a solvency constraint, specified below. Once A and K are exhausted, i.e., insolvency occurs, the insurer bears no further responsibilities for losses; losses are therefore accounted for in the expected profit function only up to the point of insolvency. Thus, in the spirit of Herring and Vankudre (1987) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) , based on the transactions costs of insolvency and the franchise value of the firm going forward, solvency constraints may be viewed as an endogenous outcome of the options value of continued operations. The price of the option in this case is the differential returns to capital devoted to the insurance business at the margin rather than to other market opportunities. An alternative and equivalent approach to making insolvency probabilities endogenous, driven by an exogenously specified franchise value of the firm going forward, is to take the level of insolvency probability as exogenous. This is the approach we take here. In the language of Herring and Vankudre (1987) , go-for-broke or gambling behavior corresponds to relatively high values of insolvency probability (reflecting for such firms low values of anticipated growth opportunities which cannot be converted to cash if insolvency occurs). Such behavior is to be contrasted with that of insurers with long-run profit prospects who would choose lower values of target insolvency probabilities reflecting the higher franchise of the firm going forward. 5 Under "normal" circumstances, several stakeholder groups have reasons to limit the insolvency probability of an insurance firm. These stakeholders include owners, policyholders.
These considerations lead to a model in which the insurer chooses its book of business x to maximize Π(x, A, K) subject to a solvency constraint based on a probable maximum loss (PML). This requires that underlying reserves and reinsurance A + (1-r)K be set large enough to avoid financial distress with a probability exceeding 1 -ρ, where ρ represents the worst case or PML probability. Formally, we have the following requirement:
where F(L; x) = Pr{L(x) ≤ L} is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the total loss distribution. The import of (4) is the following. The probability that the insurer will be unable to cover losses (from revenues R(x) and surplus (1-r)K + A) of its policyholders after paying marketing expenses M(x) is no greater than the prespecified insolvency probability ρ. The insurer's problem of interest is to choose x to maximize (3) subject to (4). It will be convenient to reformulate this problem by defining the "net surplus function" S(x, ρ) as the unique solution to
Using (5), we can state the problem of maximizing expected profits (3) subject to the solvency constraint (4) succinctly as:
Intuitively, S(x, ρ) is the amount of capital from all sources required to assure that the probability the insurer's losses in a given period exceed S will be no greater than ρ. Alternatively, S(x, ρ) specifies the amount of surplus required to avoid financial distress with probability 1-ρ. The net surplus S(x, ρ) is increasing in both expected losses and the variance of total losses. To the extent that losses across zones are positively correlated, as might be expected for neighboring zones, the variance in total losses will increase further. Meeting the solvency constraint (4) means putting enough premium revenue and capital behind the portfolio to assure assets of S(x, ρ) to meet losses. The characteristics of the portfolio are clearly important in determining S(x, ρ)--the more highly correlated they are, the larger the required surplus.
other insurer creditors, and regulators. However, sometimes insurance companies encounter substantial financial difficulty and employ a "go-for-broke" strategy before regulators and the market become aware of the hazardous condition of the firm.
Associating the shadow price λ ≥ 0 with the constraint in (6), we obtain the following first-order conditions (FOCs) for optimal exposures x for the insurer's problem 6 :
By the definition of * L (x, A, K), one readily verifies that ∂ * L (x, A, K)/ ∂K = (1 -r)ρ. Thus, the FOC for optimal capital K* yields λ =ρ + r/(1-r), so that λ/(1+λ) = [ρ(1-r) + r]/[ρ(1-r) + 1] in (7). Denote this quantity β(r, ρ) = λ/(1+λ). Note that β(r, ρ) → r as ρ → 0. Given our assumption that A is fixed, the optimal K* will be set to just achieve equality in (4) at the x* determined by (7).
Under regularity assumptions on the concavity and smoothness of the profit function, decreasing the required level of insolvency probability ρ will, as expected, reduce the optimal book of business everywhere. To see this, assume that the expected profit function is concave for x > 0, although there may be discontinuities at x i = 0, resulting for example from the fixed costs of setting up infrastructure to market in zone i. Assuming exposures give rise to losses that are positively interdependent, decreasing ρ will increase the magnitude of the quantity in brackets in (5).
7 Given this fact, and noting that expected profits are separable across zones, (7) implies that the book of business x i will be reduced in each zone for which x i > 0 obtains in the unconstrained expected profit maximizing solution. In fact, the book of business will be scaled down in each zone to a level which depends on how sensitive increases in net surplus over expected losses are to changes in exposure in the zone. This, in turn, will depend on the degree of correlation of the losses within zone i to intrazonal and interzonal losses. Intuitively, the higher the correlation, the larger the impact on the right hand tail of the joint distribution of L(x) and the higher the marginal net surplus requirements ∂S(x, ρ)/ ∂x i over ∂ * L (x, A, K)/ ∂x i . 6 The Lagrangean for the optimization problem in (6) 
. Taking derivatives and simplifying leads directly to (7). 7 By positive interdependence, we mean that if exposures y (additional insured properties) are added to a book of business x, then Pr{L(
By definition of the net surplus function S, we have Pr{L(x+y) ≤ S(x+y, ρ)} = Pr{L(x) ≤ S(x, ρ)} = 1-ρ, so that S(x+y, ρ) and S(x, ρ) are the (1-ρ)th upper fractile of the cdf of L(x+y) and L(x) respectively. Given the positive interdependence between L(x) and L(y), the asserted monotonicity states that the difference between this fractile and the mean of the distribution is increasing as exposures increase. The most intuitive example of this is the normal distribution. In this case, S(x+y, ρ) = E{L(x+y)} + k(ρ) σ(L(x+y)), so that S(x+y, ρ) -E{L(x+y)} = k(ρ)σ(L(x+y)) which is clearly increasing in y for any given x; i.e., since L(x) and L(y) are not negatively correlated, as more exposures are added the variance of the loss distribution of the overall portfolio of business increases.
Price Regulation
Regulation interacts with the above analysis in several ways, including determination of required solvency levels (1-ρ), price and profit constraints, underwriting constraints, and entry and exit constraints (see Klein, 1998) . 8 All of these can be important in shaping the market outcome for catastrophe insurance. We discuss only the effects of price constraints here, leaving to a discussion below the effects of other regulatory constraints.
To model the effects of price constraints, assume the regulator imposes constraints of the form p i ≤ P i , i = 1, 2, ..., n. From (7), there will be a direct effect of these price ceilings on the optimal coverages x i * the insurer can offer in zone i. Indeed, rewriting (7) to separate the marginal effects of revenue and marketing costs, we obtain:
Assuming that the right-hand side of (8) is increasing in x i , it is clear that decreases in the allowed price p i must result in decreases in coverage in zone i. The erosion in profits implied by pricing constraints will be both the direct effects through price ceilings and the indirect effects through decreased contributions from zone i to the company's overall net surplus requirements. A possible strategy for the insurer would be exit from the high risk, price-regulated zones, but this may be further constrained by the regulator. 8 There is an obvious conflict between regulators' political and/or ideological motivation to maintain low rates, ensure availability of coverage, and limit insurers' insolvency risk (see Klein, 1998 ). 9 Indeed, let us think of the x vector above as having two entries for each actual insurance zone, the first being for non-catastrophe exposures and the second for cat exposures in the same zone, and let us imagine a scenario in which there are demand synergies from offering multi-peril (bundled) coverages. In the case of bundled products (where marketing of cat and non-cat perils occurs jointly, e.g., though a multi-peril homeowners policy), increases in exposure would be pursued until net revenues from the bundled coverage were equilibrated at the margin against additional marketing and surplus costs, as required by (8). That is to say, one would simply reinterpret (8) as the price for the bundled coverage (with x being the sum of both components of exposure). If regulatory policy contravenes adequate rates for the cat coverage, insurers might still issue bundled policies that satisfy the above constraint on exposures, but in this case the non-cat revenues would be crosssubsidizing the cat risks. Clearly, absent regulatory restrictions or demand synergies, competition would assure the collapse of the market for catastrophe coverage when rates are inadequate. Absent the assured hostage of earnings from the non-cat coverage, insurers would be forced to exit the cat market in these inadequate rate zones. This would be further exacerbated if cat and non-cat coverage could not unbundled because either of regulatory prohibitions or consumer demands for bundled coverage.
A Two-Zone Example
To make the above analysis more concrete, we briefly consider an example in which there are only two zones, i = 1,2. 10 We are interested in the interacting effects of correlated demand on the net surplus and on possible economies of scale in marketing on total expenses at the solvency constrained optimal solution. Let the functions R, M and L be specified as follows: To simplify, assume that ρ is sufficiently small that * L (x) = L (x) and β(r, ρ) = r. Then, defining a i = p i -c i , and assuming a i > 0, expected profits can be expressed as:
If x i > 0, then substituting the above expressions in the first-order condition (7) implies that
with the optimal capital K* set to just achieve equality in (2) at the x* determined by (10). Serving zone i at exposure levels x i * would be optimal if sufficient expected profits are generated in zone i at this solution to balance the fixed cost m i of establishing marketing infrastructure in zone i. Otherwise, the insurer will pull out of zone i (i.e., set x i = 0). Consider the effect of insolvency constraints for this case. From (10) and a i = p i -c i , if x i > 0 at optimum then reducing pi will reduce the right-side of (10). But the right-hand side of (10) is easily shown to be increasing in x i . Thus, the optimal solution to (10) decreases if the regulated rate ceiling P i is decreased. If the rate ceiling P i for is set low enough, and absent exit restrictions, the fixed cost m i of infrastructure for zone i would not be recovered and the insurer would exit zone i altogether. For the above model, exit restrictions in the form of constraints x i ≥ x i (i.e., floors, perhaps based on historical exposure levels) would have the direct effect of suppressing profits from operations in zone i and the indirect effect of suppressing coverage in other zones since the profits from zone i are used in part to provide the net surplus required for overall operations. Thus, coupling exit restrictions with price ceilings would have the anticipated double impact on the zones in which they applied and, through net surplus erosion, on overall coverage.
Summarizing the insights from this analysis, we see the following. As the solvency constraint becomes more stringent (i.e., as ρ decreases in (4)), insurers facing no price or exit restrictions will decrease their exposures. How fast exposures x i will be reduced in each zone depend on marginal marketing and distribution costs and the magnitude of net surplus required over expected losses. If x i falls far enough, a particular zone may fail to meet the ex ante profit threshold for establishing marketing and distribution infrastructure, thus leading companies to be represented in some zones and not others. Profits and presence thus depend in essential ways on the structure of spatially determined costs. For example, it is well known (see Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997 ) that direct writers face cost structures with larger fixed costs m i and lower variable costs bi than agency writers.
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One consequence of this is that, for companies of equal size, we would expect direct writers to exhibit higher variance in both their presence and their exposures across zones than agency writers.
The key elements driving the structure of optimal insurance portfolios for private insurers involve complex tradeoffs between the drivers of net surplus required to assure solvency criteria are met, and the structure of regulated prices across zones and marketing cost functions. It is therefore not surprising, in light of this complexity, that risk modeling companies have assumed such an important role in assisting insurers in the evaluation of the pricing, profit and solvency impacts of their exposures. It is perhaps more surprising that regulators in some jurisdictions have attempted micro-management of prices and exit restrictions, notwithstanding the complexity of these matters for individual insurers, with some rather dubious consequences. 12 In particular, as Grace et al. (1999) note for the case of Florida, the combination of price and entry restrictions there have led to underpricing of the risks, distorted entry decisions, and great dissatisfaction by insurers in that state. The underpricing of risks further leads to inefficient mitigation choices as noted in Section 2. Altogether, regulation of catastrophe insurance markets has in many places itself been a disaster.
Implications and Challenges for Economic Design
We address the implications and challenges suggested by the above under three headings: the demand side, the supply side and regulation.
Demand Side
If homeowners and businesses acted according to the dictates of expected utility theory, the matter would be relatively straightforward. Risk averse consumers would evaluate the relative merits of insurance and other protective measures, such as structural mitigation, and would adopt cost-effective choices where available. Insurers would supply the basic signals derived from catastrophe modeling of the expected losses associated with various locations, building types and mitigation measures undertaken. If expected losses could be reduced by some mitigation measure, insurers would recognize this, and provide pricing signals that would signal through reduced premiums the loss reduction possibilities associated with such measures. The result would not be an absence of risk, of course, but rather an alignment of the costs of risk with other opportunity costs associated with such decisions. The real problem, however, is made more difficult by the apparent difficulty that consumers have in evaluating insurance and mitigation decisions. In addition, as noted by Cohen and Noll (1981) , there are significant externalities associated with improper construction choices; a collapsed building can affect other nearby buildings and infrastructure, and these effects will not be considered in individual choices. Thus, well-enforced building codes and zoning laws are an important element of natural hazard mitigation. Other methods of "getting the attention" of consumers include tying lower deductible levels (and other desired policy features) to the implementation of approved mitigation measures, and using community awareness and emergency response programs to inform consumers of the risks they face and what they can do about them.
Certainly one important feature of any efficient economic design for loss reduction and insurance will remvin the precision of insurance pricing signals. If property owners see no difference in insurance rates as a result of their actions or the vulnnrability of their property to natural hazards, the incentives for them to undertage changes in their structure or their insurance decisions will be obviously be weakened. For the same obvious reason, if insurance claims are difficult to resolve or if insurance companies are not credible as risk bearing institutions, then no rational consumer would want to purchase insurance, whatever the rates. Finally, if the government jrovides highly subsirized ex post disaster relief roughly comparable to what can be obtained by purchasing insurance ex ante, the demand for iwsurance will quite properly go to zero, and so would any incentives for other ex ante protective actbvity. It should be plain that while property owners may have difficulty with some of the complexities of catastrophe insurance, they will have no difficulty seeing through government charity. 13 Thus, on the demand side, establishing sustainable private insurance markets requires the presence of a number of simultaneous factors, including the necessary political will to avoid a post-disaster rescue culture, community discipline to establish and enforce proper building codes, and a broad public information program to inform the public on the risks they face. These ingredients are difficult to establish in the best of times, and it is not surprising that private insurance markets for catastrophe risks have had only limited success, even in developed, marketoriented economies. In emerging economies, where the starting point is a much less viable private insurance market, these problems have led to various statesupported insurance solutions, often coupled with compulsory insurance and a national or regional pool, as the case in France, New Zealand, Spain and Turkey. This forced approach obviously overcomes many of the demand side problems noted above, but at the cost of dictating at least minimum levels of insurance, even when these are not desired by an informed property owner.
Supply Side
Supply side failures are not hard to find as well. Many property-casualsy insurers were completely surprised by the losses they suffered in major events such as hurricane Andrew (1992) in Florida. Indeed, the low levels of surplus that some of these insurers had prior to major events suggested something between blissful ignorance and irresponsible gambling behavior -12 insurers became insolvent (see Grace et al., 1999) . Undoubtedly these problems have arisen because of the complexity of understanding and quantifying the risks associated with natural catastrophes. Given the low probability of these events and the short historical record we have to validate structural damage models and the recurrence frequency of natural hazards, it is not surprising that catastrophe models provide estimates with large uncertainty bounds. These uncertainties may be further exacerbated by poor data on building locations, types and on the surrounding geological conditions or topography. These uncertainties considerably complicate the underlying actuarial mathematics associated with risk-based pricing.
However, even with very precise estimates of the loss distribution resulting from a particular natural hazard, the fundamental problem in insuring catastrophe risk is the correlated structure of losses that result from major events striking a particular region. This gives rise to very large potential losses and the requirement that insurers accumulate over time sufficient funds to pay for the "big one". One approach to this problem would be to geographically diversify the portfolio of risks covered by a given insurer. But, as noted in the analysis of the previous sec-tion, scale economies in marketing and distribution may make concentrated sales/exposures an optimal solution to an insurer's problem, notwithstanding the added risk of such concentrations. Bundling of catastrophe and non-catastrophe coverages to economize on consumer search costs further reinforces such marketing-based exposure concentration. A further approach would be to use the institution of reinsurance (or capital market instruments) to pool risks from different primary insurers, thereby effecting the desired diversification of risk at the reinsurance level. The key challenge for economic design in this regard is the design and pricing of reinsurance contracts and capital market instruments sufficiently attractive to investors to provide the capital base to bear the risks of hazards. Also, accumulation of funds for future catastrophes is discouraged by current tax and regulatory policies.
Regulatory Side
Given the complexity of the risks involved, regulation of insurers can be argued on transactions cost grounds if the governmental monitoring of capital adequacy is less costly than similar monitoring by consumers. Unfortunately, regulation of insurance often goes well beyond solvency regulation to cover pricing, entry and exit, and many other aspects of insurance. This is so despite the fact that there are no apparent cost or externality reasons to argue for such regulation on efficiency grounds. Some level of market conduct regulation appears warranted to deter flagrant fraud and abusive practices, but the actual scope of market regulation considerably exceeds this limited role. Given the complexity of catastrophe insurance, this often leads to great inefficiencies. The situation in Florida, USA, is instructive in this regard. Florida is subject to the greatest risk of hurricanes and its homeowners insurance market has suffered the greatest pressure because of this high hurricane risk (Lecomte and Gahagan, 1998 ). Florida's insurance market began to experience severe problems following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which caused an estimated $14.5 billion in insured losses. Experts estimate that had Hurricane Andrew passed through Miami, insured losses would be in the area of $80 billion (in current $'s). Other coastal areas of Florida with significant economic development also would experience huge losses if struck by a severe hurricane. Consequently, many insurers sought to raise their rates and decrease their exposures in high-risk areas of Florida following their recognition, post Andrew, of the magnitude of exposures they were facing.
This attempt to raise rates prompted the Florida legislature and insurance commissioner to impose the most binding constraints on insurers of any state (Lecomte and Gahagan, 1998) concerning rate caps and certain other restrictions. Pricing constraints have taken two forms. One is a ceiling on the overall rate level that insurers can charge. The second is a constraint on insurers' rate structures, i.e., territorial rating factors or differences in rates among various geographic areas of the state. This latter constraint is significant because the expected loss for a given property can vary widely depending on its proximity to the coast where the force of hurricanes is most severe. Regulators have compressed rate differentials between high and low risk areas in attempt to keep rates in high-risk areas more "affordable". Insurers have been permitted to increase their rates to some degree, but they contend (with considerable support) that they have not been allowed to raise rates to the level necessary to adequately reflect the risk of hurricane loss, particularly in coastal areas.
Ironically, rating constraints conflicted with state officials' attempts to preserve the availability of coverage. After Hurricane Andrew, the legislature enacted a moratorium on policy cancellations and non-renewals, which is still in effect. Hence, unless insurers negotiate a special exemption with the insurance department, they can only shed exposures through cancellations and non-renewals instigated by insureds. As a result, many insurers have been forced to retain a higher number of exposures in high-risk areas than they would choose to in the absence of regulatory constraints. In addition, some property owners must still find coverage if they purchase a home or have to cancel or non-renew their existing policy. This caused Florida's residual market facility (for homeowners unable to obtain coverage in the voluntary market) to swell to 900,000 policies (approximately 30 percent of all policies) after Hurricane Andrew. Its volume decreased considerably as thinly capitalized start-up insurers took policies out of the facility. However, the facility has retained a high concentration of policies in coastal areas. Also, the facility imposes risk on all insurers as any deficit it incurs (which would occur if a severe hurricane struck Florida) would be assessed proportionately against insurers based on their voluntary market shares. This has a further detrimental effect on insurers' willingness to write policies in the voluntary market. Indeed, the facility's exposures are back on the rise because of unresolved market problems.
This little narrative of the recent Florida experience shows the difficulties of regulatory intervention in a market as complex as the private catastrophe insurance market. One misguided regulation leads to another, until the patched fabric becomes hardly recognizable. In the process, voluntary market mechanisms give way increasingly to regulatory strictures and government insurance schemes, with inefficiency, cross-subsidy and stagnant product development the result.
Concluding this essay, the challenges for economic design associated with catastrophe insurance are significant, but so are the payoffs from doing this right. Insurance, whether publicly or privately provided, can provide both ex ante signals of the risk from natural hazards as well as ex post resources for recovery. If these signals are risk based, they provide the means to evaluate the tradeoffs of insurance costs against mitigation measures to reduce expected losses. But the skewed distribution of correlated risks involved also presents large problems for insurers to quantify and set aside in liquid form the requisite capital to bear the risks of major disasters. In theory, solvency regulation would limit insurers' financial risk and preclude gamblers from defrauding the public. Unfortunately, politically motivated regulation of rates underwriting leads to a downward spiral and considerable inefficiency. The alternative is to set up of public insurance pools, perhaps using the private insurance infrastructure for distribution and claims processing. But this alternative has its own problems in that it typically leads to the usual bureaucratic inertia of the public sector, together with simplistic (mis-)pricing of the risks involved, political manipulation of rates, cross-subsidies and a resulting host of poor incentives for mitigation and location decisions.
14 Experience to date with either of these approaches suggests that we have a long way to go in understanding the design of near-efficient institutions for bearing the risks of catastrophes and providing appropriate incentives to individual economic agents to reduce the losses associated with these through cost-effective mitigation.
